

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JUDY GLUCK on behalf of herself and
all other similarly situated consumers

Plaintiff,

-against-

PROFESSIONAL RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.

Defendant.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Introduction

1. Plaintiff, Judy Gluck seeks redress for the illegal practices of Professional Recovery Services, Inc. in which it unlawfully engaged in the collection of consumer debts in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”).
2. Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of New York who resided within this District.
3. Plaintiff is a consumer as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3) of the FDCPA.
4. The alleged debt that Defendant sought to collect from the Plaintiff involves a consumer debt.
5. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s principal place of business is located within Voorhees, New Jersey.
6. Defendant is regularly engaged, for profit, in the collection of debts allegedly owed by consumers.

7. Defendant is a “debt collector” as that term is defined by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6).

Jurisdiction and Venue

8. This Court has federal question jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
9. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as the acts and transactions that give rise to this action occurred, in substantial part, within this district.

Allegations Particular to Judy Gluck

10. Upon information and belief, on a date better known by Defendant, Defendant began to attempt to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff.
11. Within the one year immediately preceding the filing of this complaint, the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff on multiple occasions via telephone and left numerous voice messages in an attempt to collect the alleged obligation.
12. By way of limited example only, the following is a transcript of one such message that Defendant left for Plaintiff on her cellular telephone voicemail system on or about October 24, 2012:

"This is a message Judy Gluck if we've reached the wrong number please call us at 866 4884918 otherwise call me Judy Gluck call back number at 8664884918 extension 3240 this is Hannah Medlin from Professional Recovery Services ... my number again is 8664884918 ext 3240."

13. At the time Plaintiff received the said messages, she did not know the identity of the caller.
14. At the time Plaintiff received the said messages, she did not know any person named "Hannah Medlin from Professional Recovery Services."

15. At the time Plaintiff received the said messages, she did not know any company named "Professional Recovery Services."
16. At the time Plaintiff received the said messages, she did not know that the caller was a debt collector.
17. At the time Plaintiff received the said messages, she did not know that the call concerned the collection of a debt.
18. Each of the said messages is a "communication" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).
19. Each of the messages were left by persons employed by Defendant as non-attorney debt collectors in connection with the collection of a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
20. Each of the above messages uniformly failed to identify the callers as debt collectors attempting to collect a debt.
21. The only way for Plaintiff and/or any least sophisticated consumer to obtain the identity of the caller leaving the messages, and to ascertain the purpose underlying the messages, was to place a return call to the telephone number provided in the messages and to speak with a debt collector employed by Professional Recovery Services, Inc., and to provide the debt collector with personal information.
22. The Defendant intended that the messages have the effect of causing Plaintiff, and other least sophisticated consumers, to place return calls to the telephone number provided in the messages and to speak with its' debt collectors, and then provide those debt collectors with their personal information, as the sole means of obtaining the identity of the caller leaving the messages, and to ascertain the purpose underlying the messages.

Scores of federal court decisions -- including the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals and Districts Courts within the State of New York -- uniformly hold that the FDCPA requires debt

collectors to provide meaningful identification of itself in telephonic voice messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating the name of the debt collection company and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call.

23. At all times relevant to this action, Professional Recovery Services, Inc. was aware of the substantial weight of legal authority requiring it to provide meaningful identification of itself in telephonic voice messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating its company name and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call.
24. At all times relevant to this action, Professional Recovery Services, Inc. willfully, deliberately, and intentionally chose not to provide meaningful identification of itself in telephonic voice messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating its company name and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call.
25. The Defendant's act of leaving the said messages for Plaintiff is conduct the natural consequences of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with the collection of a debt and is in violation of the FDCPA.
26. The Defendant's act of leaving the said messages for Plaintiff constitutes the use of a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt and is in violation of the FDCPA.
27. The FDCPA secures a consumer's right to have a debt collector cease further communications with the consumer. By failing to meaningfully identify itself, disclose the purpose of its call and state that Professional Recovery Services, Inc. is a debt collector in a manner understandable to the least sophisticated consumer, the Defendant has engaged in conduct designed to deprive consumers of their right to have a debt collector cease further communications.

28. It is Defendant's policy and practice to leave telephonic voice messages for consumers and other persons, such as the above said messages, that violate the FDCPA by, inter alia:
 - (a) Failing to provide meaningful disclosure of Professional Recovery Services, Inc.'s identity;
 - (b) Failing to disclose that the call is from a debt collector; and
 - (c) Failing to disclose the purpose or nature of the communication, i.e. an attempt to collect a debt.
29. Upon information and belief, such messages, as alleged in this complaint, number at least in the hundreds.
30. Upon information and belief, the said messages were either pre-scripted or pre-recorded.
31. Defendant has engaged in a pattern of leaving messages without disclosing that the communication is from a debt collector.
32. The said telephone messages are in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(10) and 1692e(11) for failing to indicate that the messages were from a debt collector, which constitutes a deceptive practice.
33. On or about January 3, 2013, Mary, a representative of Professional Recovery Services, Inc. called and left a message with a third party.
34. The representative asked the third party to give the Plaintiff a message that she call back Professional Recovery Services, Inc. at 866-488-4918 ext. 4250.
35. On or about January 10, 2013, Phil Polestar, a representative of Professional Recovery Services, Inc. called and left a message with a third party.

36. The representative asked the third party to give the Plaintiff a message that she call back Professional Recovery Services, Inc. at 866-488-4918 ext. 3239 saying: "I need to speak to her as soon as possible."

37. On or about January 15, 2013, Elliot Rivera, a representative of Professional Recovery Services, Inc. called and left a message with a third party.

38. The representative asked the third party to give the Plaintiff a message that she call back Professional Recovery Services, Inc. at 866-488-4918 ext. 3268.

While a majority of the courts have ruled that under the FDCPA, a debt collector may not have a right to leave a message on a voicemail system and in fact, risks violating either 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(6), 1692e(11) or 1692c(b) if it does so. *See e.g. Carman v. CBE Group, Inc.*, (2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29730 (D. Kan. Mar. 23, 2011) (It is well settled that when a debt collector contacts or reaches a third party and chooses to leave any message at all to be conveyed to the debtor, such a communication being left with a third party will in fact violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(6), 1692e(11).); *Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs.*, (2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67719 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006) (The court followed *Foti*, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 655-56 and *West v. Nationwide Credit*, 998 F. Supp. 642, 644 (W.D.N.C. 1998) in finding that a phone call to a debtor's neighbor that the defendant had a "very important" matter to address was "regarding a debt" because the content of the phone call was "with respect to" the Defendant's efforts to collect on plaintiff's alleged arrearage and since a phone message that "advised the debtor that the matter required immediate attention, and provided a specific number to call to discuss the matter" was a communication under the FDCPA "given that the obvious purpose of the message was to provide the debtor with enough information to entice a return call. The court noted "Were this Court to determine

that [the debt collectors] messages did not constitute communications "regarding [Plaintiff's] debt", the Court would be creating an exception to swallow the rule. Under such an exception, debt collectors would be able to abuse and harass consumers with phone calls and other forms of correspondence so long as there is no express mention of the consumers' debts. The court also found: "A message left by a debt collector which does not state that it pertains to a financial matter could reasonably pertain to a host of issues - including family or medical matters - which may be viewed by a consumer as much more pressing than a debt owed. The apparent purpose of these messages is to be vague enough to provoke the recipient to return the calls in haste. Leaving a message that deceptively entices a consumer to communicate with a debt collector when he is caught off guard is precisely the kind of abuse the FDCPA intended to prevent.") (emphasis added); Krapf v. Collectors Training Institute of Illinois, Inc., (Dist. Court, WD New York 2010) (Holding that contact with a third party that did not involve an inquiry into plaintiff's location information but rather left a message for the debtor was a violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692(b), 1692(c)(b), and 1692(d).); West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642 (W.D.N.C.1998) (Section 15 U.S.C. 1692(c)(b) should be broadly interpreted to prohibit a debt collector, in connection with the collection of any debt, from conveying any information relating to a debt to a third party. The consumer's complaint alleging that the debt collector telephoned Plaintiff's neighbor leaving collector's name and telephone number and asking the neighbor to have consumer return the call, stated a claim for violation of § 1692c(b).); Romano v. Williams & Fudge, Inc., (644 F. Supp. 2d 653 - Dist. Court, WD Pennsylvania 2008 quoting West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642 - Dist. Court, WD North Carolina 1998) (A complaint alleging that debt collector telephoned

Plaintiff's neighbor leaving collector's name and telephone number and asking the neighbor to have Plaintiff return call stated a claim for violation of Section 1692(c)(b).); Thomas v. Consumer Adjustment Co., Inc., (579 F. Supp. 2d 1290 - Dist. Court, ED Missouri 2008 quoting West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642 - Dist. Court, WD North Carolina 1998) (Holding that 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c)(b) does not prohibit only those third-party communications in which some information about the debt is actually disclosed because that reading would render § 1692(b) superfluous.); Blair v. Sherman Acquisition, (Dist. Court, ND Illinois 2004 quoting West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642 - Dist. Court, WD North Carolina 1998) (All provisions of the statute must be considered and each term must be interpreted equally, so as not to deflect from the meaning of the statute. Specifically, as to 15 U.S.C. § 1692, every clause and word must be given force, and § 1692(c)(b) should be broadly interpreted to prohibit a debt collector from conveying any information to a third party that concerns a debt (except for the purpose of obtaining location information as permitted under § 1692(b).); Mathis v. Omnium Worldwide, (Dist. Court, D. Oregon 2006 quoting West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642 - Dist. Court, WD North Carolina 1998) ("`Other than to obtain location information, a debt collector may not contact third persons such as a consumer's friends, neighbors, relatives, or employer. Such contacts are not legitimate collection practices and result in serious invasions of privacy, as well as the loss of jobs.'"); West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642, 645 n.2 (W.D.N.C. 1998) (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-382, reprinted at 1977 U.S. Code & Admin. News 1695, 1699); Krapf v. Collectors Training Institute of Illinois, Inc., (Dist. Court, WD New York 2010 quoting West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642, 643-45 (W.D.N.C. 1998) (Contact with a third party that did not involve an inquiry into Plaintiff's location

information, but rather, revealed that Plaintiff had a "business matter" stated a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c)(b) finding that the Plaintiff's allegation that the Defendant contacted a third party to relay about a "very important" matter regarding the Plaintiff. Plaintiff sufficiently stated claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(b), 1692(c)(b), and 1692(d).). And finally, the famous *Foti v. NCO* which gave the name to the now all common FOTI claim already quoted in almost all circuits as a FOTI claim - TO DATE OVER 40 COURTS HAVE ADOPTED FOTIS DEFINITION OF INDIRECT COMMUNICATION. Foti v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., (424 F. Supp. 2d 643 - Dist. Court, SD New York 2006). Judge Karas in *Foti* based their reasoning on *West v. Nationwide Credit*. In Judge Karas' own words in *Foti* ("In *West v. Nationwide Credit*, 998 F.Supp. 642, 644 (W.D.N.C.1998), the court rejected a narrow interpretation of the word "communication," similar to that advanced by NCO in this case. The Plaintiff in *West* alleged that Defendants violated § 1692(c)(b) by contacting Plaintiffs neighbor. Defendants argued that a debt collector's phone call informing a neighbor that he had a "very important" matter to discuss did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c)(b) because no information was actually conveyed about Plaintiffs debt. The *West* court rejected this narrow interpretation of "communication" in favor of a broader interpretation. *Id.* at 644. In reaching this conclusion, the *West* court noted that "[i]n interpreting the meaning of a statute, it is well settled that '[t]he "plain meaning" of statutory language controls its construction,'" and went on to examine the dictionary definitions of "regarding." *Id.* (quoting *657*657 Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux*, 69 F.3d 608, 610 (1st Cir.1995).) In particular, the court noted: "Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1st ed.1983) defines the term 'regard' as, *inter alia*, 'to relate to,' while it provides the following definition of the term 'regarding': 'with respect to: concerning.'" *Id.* "Based on

these definitions, the court believes the ordinary meaning of the term 'regarding' is consistent with the broader interpretation advocated by Plaintiff." *Id.* This conclusion has been embraced by other courts as well in the context of applying § 1692(c)(b). See, e.g., *Henderson*, 2001 WL 969105, at *2 (rejecting Defendant's argument that letter sent to employer seeking information about whether Plaintiff was employed, her wage scale, her type of employment, the full name of her employer, and if terminated, the name of her present employer, did not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c)(b) because it did not suggest a debt collection purpose). Thus, given the choice of language by Congress, the FDCPA should be interpreted to cover communications that convey, directly or indirectly, any information relating to a debt, and not just when the debt collector discloses specific information about the particular debt being collected. Indeed, a narrow reading of the term "communication" to exclude instances such as the present case where no specific information about a debt is explicitly conveyed could create a significant loophole in the FDCPA, allowing debtors to circumvent the 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(11) disclosure requirement, and other provisions of the FDCPA that have a threshold "communication" requirement, merely by not conveying specific information about the debt. In fact, under Defendant's interpretation of "communication," a debt collector could call regularly after the thirty-day validation notice is sent, and not be subject to the 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(11) requirement so long as the message did not convey specific information about the debt. Such a reading is inconsistent with 658*658 Congress's intent to protect consumers from "serious and widespread" debt collection abuses.); Krug v. Focus Receivables Mgmt., LLC, (2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45850 (D.N.J. May 11, 2010)); Henderson v. Eaton, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13243 (E.D. La. Aug.23, 2001) quoting *West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc.*, 998 F. Supp. 642 (W.D.N.C.1998)

(holding that under § 1692(c)(b), a debt collector may not communicate with a third party "in connection with the collection of any debt" except to obtain location information as provided in § 1692(b). To violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b), the third party communication need only be "in connection with the collection of a debt;" it need not expressly mention the debt or debt collection as "communication" includes conveying information about a debt "indirectly." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).); Henderson v. Eaton, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 274 (E.D. La. Jan. 2, 2002) (FDCPA class action certified); Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67719 quoting West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642 (W.D.N.C.1998) (Finding that a phone call to a debtor's neighbor that the Defendant had a "very important" matter to address was "regarding a debt" because the content of the phone call was "with respect to" the Defendant's efforts to collect on Plaintiff's alleged arrearage.); Wideman v. Monterey Fin. Servs., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38824 (finding that the messages left by the Defendant constituted "communications" even though they did not technically mention any information about the debt and stated a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c)(b) since it was not left for the purpose of obtaining location information which is the only permissible communication with third parties under the FDCPA, quoting West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642, 644-45 (W.D.N.C. 1998) and quoting Belin v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47953, 2006 WL 1992410 at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2006) (which found that the message was a communication under the FDCPA even though it was not disclosed that it came from a debt collector where the name of the company was referenced, directions to return the call were given, and the purpose of the message was to induce the debtor to return the call.); Shand-Pistilli v. Professional Account Servs., Inc., 2010 WL 2978029 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2010) (The consumer adequately alleged

that Defendant contacted a third party in violation of § 1692(c)(b) since the Defendant's inquiry went beyond the boundaries of location information. A debt collector may not seek additional information about a consumer because such information is beyond the scope of location information.); Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010) (A "communication" need not refer to the debt."); Edwards v. Niagra Credit Solutions, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1350-51 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (Finding that the telephone message at issue, which referenced an "important" matter, contained information regarding a file number and whom to contact, and was left for the purpose of collecting the debt, indirectly conveyed information concerning the debt and, therefore, met the statutory definition of a "communication"); Ramirez v. Apex Financial Management, LLC, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1041 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding that the message was an indirect communication regarding the plaintiff's debt where it conveyed pertinent information including the fact that there was a matter he should attend to and instructions on how to do so.); Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Associates, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that the messages left by the Defendant constituted "communications" even though they did not technically mention specific information about the debt.); Belin v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47953, 2006 WL 1992410 at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2006) (finding that the message was a communication under the FDCPA even though it was not disclosed that it came from a debt collector where the name of the company was referenced, directions to return the call were given, and the purpose of the message was to induce the debtor to return the call.); Shaver v. Trauner, 97-1309, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19648 (C.D.Ill., Jul. 31, 1998.) (the only exception in the FDCPA which permits a debt collector to contact third parties is to obtain: "location information about the consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b). On its face, a

communication to someone other than those enumerated in the statute, and which offers or seeks information not limited to "location information." would be unlawful (class and adoption of denial of motion to dismiss.) 1998 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 19647 (C.D.Ill., May, 29, 1998) (Magistrate Judge's denial of motion to dismiss); Smith v. NCO Fin. Sys., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51576 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 2009.) (holding that the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from communicating with anyone other than the consumer and the only exception to this broad proscription is that debt collectors may, under Section 15 U.S.C. 1692(b), communicate with persons "other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer." The FDCPA defines "location information" as "a consumer's place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or his place of employment". Contact with third parties, such as employers, for any other purpose is prohibited under the FDCPA. The court noted that the Defendants' contention that the FDCPA "does not prohibit all third party contact -- only disclosure of the debt to third parties" is an untenable position, unsupported by authority and clearly at odds with the plain language of the statute.)

39. Said message was in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§, 1692c(b) and 1692d for leaving messages with third parties.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

40. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action individually, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
41. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Professional Recovery Services, Inc. and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it

attempts to collect debts.

42. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of Professional Recovery Services, Inc., and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families.
43. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the said claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
44. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories.
45. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.
46. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation:
 - (a) **Numerosity:** The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical.
 - (b) **Common Questions Predominate:** Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any

questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

- (c) **Typicality:** The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein.
- (d) **Adequacy:** The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit.
- (e) **Superiority:** A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or

varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants who, on information and belief, collect debts throughout the United States of America.

47. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination.
48. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
49. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).

AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

50. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through forty nine (49) as if set forth fully in this cause of action.
51. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of two classes.
52. Class A consists of all persons (a) whom Defendant's records reflect resided within the State of New York (b) who received telephonic messages from Defendant within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to and including the date of the filing of this Complaint (c) involving telephone messages which were placed without setting forth that the

communication was from a debt collector and (d) that the telephone messages were in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(10) and 1692e(11).

53. Class B consists of all persons (a) whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the state of New York (b) and whose neighbor, or similar party or even someone other than a spouse within the debtor's home answered a telephone call from Defendant within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to the date of the filing of the complaint; (c) the telephone calls were placed to the consumer's home or similar party seeking payment of a consumer debt by leaving a message with a third party directing the consumer to call the Defendant and (d) the Plaintiff asserts that the telephone messages were in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692d.
54. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because:
 - (a) Based on the fact that form telephonic messages are at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
 - (b) There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any question(s) affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA.
 - (c) The only individual issue involves the identification of the consumers who received such telephonic messages (i.e. the class members). This is purely a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of the Defendant.
 - (d) The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All of the respective class claims are based on substantially similar facts and legal

theories.

- (e) The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members' interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class.

55. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members' claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy.

56. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

57. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical "least sophisticated consumer."

Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

58. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

59. The Defendant's violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, entitles the Plaintiff and the members of the class to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against the Defendant and award damages as follows:

- (a) Statutory and actual damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k);
- (b) Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and
- (c) Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
March 4, 2013

/s/ Maxim Maximov
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Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable.

/s/ Maxim Maximov
Maxim Maximov, Esq.